I. A Colonial Currency in a Postcolonial World
France likes to say its colonial era is over. The people living inside its financial machinery have reason to doubt it. Start with money.
The CFA franc was created in 1945, when the letters stood for "Colonies Françaises d'Afrique." Today it is used by roughly 227 million people in fourteen African countries, in two zones: West Africa and Central Africa. Its banknotes and coins have been produced by the Bank of France at Chamalières since the beginning. A currency designed under colonial rule, tied first to the French franc and now to the euro, outlived the flags that once flew over these capitals.
For decades, member states were required to deposit a large share of their foreign-exchange reserves, historically half, in the French Treasury. In exchange they received a guarantee of convertibility. Defenders call this stability. Critics ask a simpler question: what kind of sovereignty is it when a central pillar of national economic policy is anchored in another country's institutions?
II. The Case for Stability, and Why It Falls Short
Fairness requires giving France's defenders their due. The peg has kept inflation low and made trade within the zone and with Europe easier. Countries elsewhere in Africa have suffered currency collapses, hyperinflation, and debt spirals, and the franc zone has largely avoided them. Some African economists and policymakers still defend the arrangement for exactly this reason.
But stability and dependence are not opposites. A fixed peg limits a country's ability to use its own exchange rate and interest rates to respond to shocks, to promote exporters, or to finance industrial development. It ties the monetary fortunes of Dakar, Abidjan, Douala, and Libreville to the economic needs of the eurozone, which are very different from theirs. And the fact that the poorer party never had an equal seat at the table when the terms were set is the heart of the neocolonial critique.
The pressure for change has been visible for years. In 2019, France and the West African states announced a reform: the currency would be renamed the "eco," France would leave the governance bodies of the monetary union, and the requirement to deposit reserves in France would end. The peg to the euro would remain. Meanwhile the Central African franc continued unchanged. The reform was real, but it was partial, and slow in implementation. That a system needed this much correction after sixty years tells you it was never merely technical.
III. Françafrique: More Than a Currency
Money is only one thread. The wider system is often called Françafrique, a term for the networks of influence, military cooperation, resource access, and political patronage that bound Paris to its former colonies after independence.
The pattern emerged right at decolonization. When Guinea chose full independence in 1958, rather than membership in a French community, France withdrew abruptly, taking administrative equipment and expertise with it. The message to other territories was plain: independence would come with a price. In the decades that followed, French troops intervened repeatedly in African states to prop up friendly governments or remove unfriendly ones, and French firms held privileged positions in oil, uranium, ports, telecommunications, and infrastructure. Leaders who cooperated with Paris could count on support. Those who did not often found themselves isolated.
The backlash has now arrived. In recent years, French forces have been pushed out of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger following military takeovers whose leaders won real popular applause for defying Paris. Chad and Senegal have asked French troops to leave, and bases elsewhere have been handed back. Whatever one thinks of the juntas, and their own records on democracy and human rights are poor, the public enthusiasm for expelling France shows how deeply resentment of the old arrangement runs.
IV. The Everyday Cost of Neocolonialism
These are not abstractions to the people who live under them. When a country's currency policy, defense posture, and key industries are shaped by outside interests, domestic choices narrow. Value is often extracted as raw materials rather than processed in the countries that produce them. Uranium mined in Niger lights French homes while many Nigeriens lack reliable electricity. Cocoa grown in Côte d'Ivoire becomes chocolate whose profit is made elsewhere.
A young person in Dakar, Bamako, or Douala sees this clearly. He studied in French, learned French history, and watched French companies dominate the economy of his own country. When he looks for opportunity, the road leads naturally to the country whose language he speaks and whose shadow he has lived under. Migration is rarely a random act. It follows the lines drawn by history.
V. France Invited Them
This is the part of the story France often skips. Migration from its former colonies was not simply something that happened to France. France actively recruited it.
After the Second World War, the French economy needed labor to rebuild and to fuel the prosperous decades known as the Trente Glorieuses. Workers from Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and later West and Central Africa filled factories, mines, construction sites, and car plants. Many expected to stay a few years. When France halted labor migration in 1974, family reunification meant that many stayed for good, and their children and grandchildren were born French.
The result is a country in which a significant share of citizens trace their roots to Africa, many of them Muslim. France does not collect official statistics on religion, so estimates vary, but the number is substantial, and it is made up overwhelmingly of citizens, not guests.
VI. Laïcité and the Politics of Belonging
How France treats these citizens is now one of its defining fights. The French republic is built on laïcité, a strict principle of secularism rooted in the 1905 separation of church and state. Its defenders see it as a shield protecting every citizen's freedom of conscience. Its critics argue that in practice it falls hardest on one group: laws restricting the headscarf in schools, the ban on face coverings, and the 2021 anti-"separatism" law have all landed most heavily on Muslims.
The tension peaks around public protest. After the October 2023 Hamas attack and the war in Gaza, French authorities moved to restrict pro-Palestinian demonstrations, with the courts later insisting on case-by-case assessments. Many Muslim citizens, and many non-Muslim ones, saw a double standard: a Palestinian flag or a slogan about Gaza was treated as a security problem, while other causes were treated as ordinary political expression.
There is a serious debate to be had here. France has a legitimate duty to protect its Jewish citizens from antisemitism, which has surged, and to enforce the law against incitement. But the answer cannot be to treat an entire religious community as presumptively suspect. Waving a flag at a protest is a political act, and in a free society that is protected. It is not the first move in a plot.
VII. The Myth of the Monolith
A popular narrative holds that Muslims in Europe are a single bloc with a single agenda: to colonize, to conquer, or to bring down the societies that welcomed them. This view is false, and it is dangerous.
French Muslims are not a monolith. They include Algerians and Moroccans, Senegalese and Malians, Turks and Comorians, converts and secular people of Muslim heritage, devout believers and those who rarely enter a mosque. They vote for every party, hold every kind of job, and disagree with one another about almost everything, including politics in the Middle East. Surveys repeatedly show that large majorities of French Muslims identify with France and its republican values.
And the idea that a minority of roughly one in ten citizens is secretly orchestrating chaos requires believing in a level of coordination that no community has ever possessed. Such claims have a long history in Europe, from the old fantasies about Jews to the fears once aimed at Catholics and Irish immigrants. Each time, the stereotype said more about the fears of the accusers than about the accused.
A serious critique of any ideology, including political Islamism, can and should be made. But it must target specific ideas and specific actors, not millions of fellow citizens.
VIII. The Honest Counterarguments
A fair discuss must also face the complications.
First, blaming France alone ignores African agency. Corrupt elites in many countries have enriched themselves under the system and defended it, and their own governments have failed their citizens in ways Paris did not dictate. Self-rule means accountability for its failures as well.
Second, the answer to dependence is not necessarily a better patron. Russia, China, Turkey, and Gulf states are all competing for influence in Africa, often on terms that are just as extractive. The Wagner group's record in the Sahel is a warning that the exit of France does not automatically mean freedom.
Third, integration is a real challenge. Segregated housing, concentrated unemployment, and failing schools in some French suburbs breed anger and, in a small number of cases, violence. The 2005 riots and later attacks showed it. But these are problems of exclusion and policy, which can be fixed with housing, education, and equal treatment, not proof of a civilizational war.
IX. A Way Forward
The case against neocolonialism and the case for inclusion in France are not two arguments. They are one.
Abroad, France should finish what it began in 2019: complete the monetary reform, end the arrangements that give Paris special leverage, open its markets to African processed goods, and treat African states as partners that can say no. Reparative gestures, such as returning looted cultural property and honestly teaching colonial history in French schools, matter because a country that cannot admit what it did cannot understand what it owes.
At home, France should apply its laws equally, fight antisemitism and anti-Muslim bigotry with the same energy, and decide that belonging means shared rights, not shared origin. Citizens who march for Palestine, for climate, for farmers, or for pensions are all taking part in the same democratic tradition.
France built much of its prosperity on a relationship with Africa that was never between equals. It now lives with the consequences on both sides of the Mediterranean. The test of the republic is whether it can face that history honestly, repair what it can, and treat its people, all of them, as French.
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